Abstract-We consider the detection of a binary random state based on measurements that can be manipulated by an attacker. The attacker is assumed to have full information about the true value of the state to be estimated as well as the values of all the measurements. However, the attacker can only manipulate of the measurements. The detection problem is formulated as a minimax optimization, where one seeks to construct an optimal detector that minimizes the "worst-case" probability of error against all possible manipulations by the attacker. We show that if the attacker can manipulate at least half the measurements then the optimal worst-case detector should ignore all measurements and be based solely on the a-priori information. When the attacker can manipulate less than half of the measurements , we show that the optimal detector is a threshold rule based on a Hamming-like distance between the (manipulated) measurement vector and two appropriately defined sets. For the special case where , our results provide a constructive procedure to derive the optimal detector. We also design a heuristic detector for the case where , and prove the asymptotic optimality of the detector when . Finally we apply the proposed methodology in the case of i.i.d. Gaussian measurements.
the environment, and may even lead to the loss of human life. The first-ever SCADA system malware (called Stuxnet) was found in July 2010 and rose significant concern about SCADA system security [1] , [2] . While most SCADA systems are currently running on dedicated networks, next generation SCADA will make extensive use of widespread sensing and networking, both wired and wireless, making critical infrastructures susceptible to cyber security threats. The research community has acknowledged the importance of addressing the challenge of designing secure detection, estimation and control systems [3] .
We consider a robust detection problem inspired by security concerns that arise from the possible manipulation of sensor data. We focus our attention on the detection of a binary random variable from independent measurements collected by sensors, with the caveat that some of these measurements can be manipulated by an attacker. For most of the paper, the measurement model is fairly general, as we simply assume that each of the measurements is a random variable , with a known distribution conditioned to the value of . This can capture several sensor models, e.g., binary sensors that would produce with high probability, but occasionally report an erroneous measurement ; as well as sensors that would produce continuous measurements, as in with a Gaussian . A few additional results are provided in Section VII for the latter case.
The attack model proposed is motivated by scenarios under which the "sensors" are computing units that can potentially be controlled by an attacker, which would then be able to feed arbitrary "rogue" measurements to the decision unit. These rogue measurements may bear no relationship with the true value of and could be optimized to mislead the detector into making a wrong decision. Such attacks capture scenarios where the attacker directly manipulates the physical quantity measured by the sensors. For example, the readings of power meters can be set to zero by using shunt connector and the readings of temperature sensors can be manipulated by physically heating or cooling the sensing element. In these scenarios, the cyber-system remains intact and authentication or cryptography mechanisms cannot detect the abnormal measurements. The attack model considered here also captures scenarios where the attacker has gained access to the authentication mechanism that mediates the exchange of information between the sensor unit and the detector. This would be consistent, for example, with the attacker gaining root access to the processor of the sensor and hijacking the software that reads data from a physical sensor and sends it to the detector through a data network. However, the attack model considered here would be unsuitable if the attacker were simply able to intersect messages "in-transit" between the sensor unit and the detector, as this type of attack could easily be resolved, e.g., using some form of encryption.
To minimize the detector's performance degradation in the face of the attacks considered, we construct minimax detectors that minimize the "worst-case" probability of detection error, where worst-case refers to all possible manipulations available to the attacker, as well as the fact that the attacker is assumed to have full information about the true value of and all the measurements in order to manipulate the data available to the detector. The detector does not know which of the sensors have been manipulated, but does know the number of sensors that may have been manipulated. In many practical situations, the total number of sensors that may have been manipulated is not known for certain and a worst-case assumption on its value may be required. We shall see shortly, that such an assumption would be , as any larger value for would negate the usefulness of all measurements. It turns out that we have the strongest results precisely for this case.
We want to analyze the detector design problem for all the cases where . We start by considering the case , in which the attacker can manipulate at least half of the measurements. We show that in this scenario the optimal worst-case detector should ignore all measurements and be based solely on the a-priori distribution of . This result is in sharp contrast with non-adversarial detection theory where even very noisy data can provide some information. This also highlights the power of adversarial manipulation of sensor data since an attacker that has the ability to manipulate only half of the sensors, effectively destroys all the information that can be inferred from the full set of sensors.
For the case , in which the attacker can manipulate strictly less than half of the sensors, the optimal estimator typically depends on the sensor data. Moreover, we show that the optimal estimator consists of a threshold rule that compares a Hamming-like distance between the (manipulated) measurement vector and two appropriately defined sets. In general, these sets may be difficult to compute. However, in the boundary (worst-)case we provide a procedure to construct the optimal estimator, which turns out to be a simple voting scheme. If the percentage of compromised sensors are small, i.e., , we designed a heuristic detector based on truncated sum, which achieves asymptotic optimality when goes to .
Related Work: Minimax robust detection problems have been extensively studied in the past decades [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . A classical approach assumes that the conditional distribution of sensor measurements under each hypothesis lies in a set of probability distributions, which is called an uncertainty class. One then identifies a pair of "least favorable distributions" (LFDs) from the uncertainty class, which conceptually represents the most similar and hardest to distinguish pair of distributions. The robust detector is then designed as a naive-Bayes or Neymann-Pearson detector between the LFDs. The main difficulty in applying the LFD-based method to our scenario is that there is no systematic procedure to construct the LFDs and hence the corresponding detector. As a result, in this paper, we attempt to directly compute the optimal detector instead of seeking LFDs.
Basar et al. [9] , [10] consider the problem of transmitting and decoding Gaussian signals over a communication channel with unknown input from a so-called "jammer". The unknown input is assumed to be mean square bounded by a constant, which depends upon the capability of the "jammer". Although this set-up is reasonable for analog communications where the attacker is energy-constrained, it is not practical for cyber attacks on digital communications, where the attacker can change the data arbitrarily when the integrity of the sensor is compromised.
Bayram and Gezici [11] propose a restricted NeymanPearson approach for composite hypothesis-testing in the presence of uncertainty in the prior probability distribution. Mutapcic and Kim [12] consider the problem of detecting two Gaussian signals, where the mean and covariance of the signal are uncertain. They prove that the robust linear detector design problem can be formulated as a convex optimization problem. In [13] , [14] , the authors consider the problem of detecting the presence of a signal with low Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR). The authors prove that there exists an "SNR wall", below which a detector fails to be robust with respect to the uncertainties in the fading and noise model. However, these robustness results cannot be directly applied to the secure detector design problem, as their uncertainty models are in general quite different from a cyber attack model.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section II we formulate the problem of robust detection with manipulated measurements from total measurements. In Section III and Section IV, we consider the optimal detector design for the cases and respectively. In Section V we discuss a special case where , formulate the problem of optimal detector design and provide a closed form solution. In Section VI we propose a heuristic detector design and prove its asymptotic optimality. In Section VII we provide a numerical example of i.i.d. Gaussian signals. Section VIII finally concludes the paper.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The goal is to detect a binary random variable (r.v.) with distribution w.p. w.p. where and . Without loss of generality, we assume that . To detect we have available a vector of sensor measurements , , each of which is conditionally independent from the others given . Let us assume that the probability measure generated by random variable is when and when . In other words, for any Borel-measurable set , the following holds:
Moreover, let us define the product measure Let us define the inner measures induced by as respectively. Therefore, for an arbitrary set (not necessarily Borel-measurable), where is the Borel-algebra on . We further assume that measures and are absolutely continuous with respect to each other for any . Hence the log-likelihood ratio of is well defined as where is the Radon-Nikodym derivative. Further we define the log-likelihood ratio of as We assume that an attacker wants to increase the probability that we make an error in detecting . To this end, the attacker has the ability to manipulate of the sensor measurements, but we do not know which of the measurements have been manipulated. Formally, this means that our estimate of has to rely on a vector of manipulated measurements defined by (1) where the attacker chooses the sensor-selection vector taking values in and the bias vector taking values in . The in (1) denotes entry-wise multiplication of two vectors. By selecting which entries of are nonzero, the attacker chooses which of the sensors will be manipulated. The "magnitude" of manipulation is determined by .
The detection problem is formalized as a minimax problem where one wants to select an optimal detector (2) so as to minimize the probability of error, for the worst case manipulation by the adversary. Following Kerckhoffs' Principle [15] that security should not rely on the obscurity of the system, our goal is to design the detector assuming that is known to the attacker. We also take the conservative approach that the attacker has full information about the state of the system. Namely, the underlying and all the measurements are assumed to be known to the attacker. In addition the attacker can manipulate up to of the sensors. We assume that the defender knows how many sensors may be compromised, but cannot identify them. Our goal is to analyze the problem for different values of , ranging from 1 to .
Remark 1: The parameter can be interpreted as a design parameter for the defender. In general, increasing will increase the resilience of the detector under attack. However, as is shown in the rest of the paper, a large will result in performance degradation during normal operation when no sensor is compromised. Therefore, there exists a trade-off between resilience and efficiency (under normal operation), which can be tuned by choosing a suitable parameter .
To compute the worst-case probability of error that we seek to minimize, we consider given values of , and a detector , for which an optimal policy for the attacker can be written as follows:
, where the selection of the manipulation pair tries to get in (2) as low as possible when (ideally as low as 1) or as high as possible when (ideally as high as 1). The min and max are attainable since only takes 1.
Under this worst-case attacker policy, a correct decision will be made only when the pair belongs to the set (3) where and denote the set of measurement values for which the attacker cannot force the estimate to be 1 and 1, respectively, i.e., For a given detector , the worst-case probability of error is then given by the measure of the set defined in (3) and can be expressed as (4) where the false alarm rate and the probability of detection are defined as
One should think of as the measure of the set conditioned to and of as the measure of the set conditioned to . The use of inner measures ensures that is well defined even if these sets are not measurable. 1 Formally, the problem under consideration is to determine the optimal detector in (2) that minimizes the worst-case probability of error in (4):
From the discussion above, we can recognize and as "good" sets for the detector, in the sense that when measurements fall in these sets the attacker cannot induce errors. From this perspective, good detection policies obviously correspond to these sets being large. This statement is formalized, without proof, in the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Given two functions , if and , then . Next section will illustrate the case where half or more sensors are compromised.
III. OPTIMAL DETECTOR DESIGN FOR
In this section we consider the case when half or more of the measurements can be manipulated by the attacker. We show that, in this case, the attacker can render the information provided by the manipulated measurement vector useless, forcing the optimal estimate to be determined exclusively from the a-priori distribution of . The minimum is achieved when , which implies that and . On the other hand, if is empty, then the optimal , and . Since we assume that , the optimal is and optimal sets are and .
IV. OPTIMAL DETECTOR DESIGN FOR
We now consider the case when less than half of the measurements can be manipulated by the attacker, i.e., . We show that the optimal detector is a threshold rule based on a Hamming-like distance between the (manipulated) measurement vector and two appropriately defined sets.
By Lemma 1, to find the optimal , we should maximize the "volume" of both and . However, it is easy to see that there is a trade-off between and . In other words, expanding one set usually results in shrinking the other set. To characterize the exact trade-off between and , we need to introduce the following notation: We denote by the metric induced by the "zero-norm," i.e., where is the "zero-norm" of , which is defined as the number of non-zero entries of the vector . While the "zeronorm" is not a norm, it is easy to verify that the function defined above is a metric. In fact, can be viewed as an extension of the Hamming distance to continuous-valued vectors. The metric can be generalized to sets in the usual way: given an element and two subsets of , we define
For convenience, we define the distance from any set to the empty set to be infinity: . The minimum in (5) is always attainable since takes only integer values.
We also need to introduce a "truncation function": Given an indexed subset of , we define the function by For a given set and . We can identify the truncated set as
On the contrary, suppose that for each indexed subset of size we have available a set . We want to find the set such that is the inverse image of under , for each . It is easy to see that can be defined in the following way: (6) We
with . Furthermore, it is worth noticing that the union of set and is not the entire space in general. It turns out to be that the concept of mutually exclusive sets provides the exact characterization of the trade-off between and , which is illustrated by the following theorems:
Theorem 2: For any detector , there exists a pair of mutually exclusive sets , such that
Theorem 3: For any pair of mutually exclusive sets , there exists a detector , defined as ,
for which the following "set inclusion" inequalities hold:
Combining Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we have the following corollary, which casts the design of the optimal detector as an optimization problem over pairs of mutually exclusive sets: Corollary 1: An optimal detector is of the following form:
,
where and are the solutions of the following optimization problem: (11) Proof: Suppose that and are the optimal solutions. By Theorem 3, we know that Now pick an arbitrary detector . By Theorem 2, there exists a pair of mutually exclusive sets and such that Since and are the optimal solutions for (11), we have which concludes the proof.
Remark 2:
The key challenge in directly applying Corollary 1 is that it does not provide a method to construct the sets that lead to the optimal , potentially requiring one to search for the optimal detector by ranging over all possible pairs of mutually exclusive sets in . In general this result does not yield a computationally viable way to determine the optimal detector, excluding a special case, which is discussed in Section V. Furthermore, even if we could find the optimal , it is possible that and could be numerically unstable and expensive to compute.
However, Corollary 1 provides a general guideline for designing detector in adversarial environments, as it effectively reduces the search space of optimal from all possible functions to the functions of the special form (10) . In fact we shall see in Section V that we can use this general result to find the optimal detector for the case , as the computation of the sets becomes trivial. In Section VI, we propose the design of a heuristic detector of form (10) for the general case and prove that our design is asymptotically optimal when is fixed and goes to infinity. Both of these detectors can be efficiently computed.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorems 2 and 3.
A. Proof of Theorem 2
For a given set and detector , in the sequel we denote by and the image of and , respectively, under the function . As stated in the following result, it turns out that these sets are always disjoint: 
B. Proof of Theorem 3
First let us prove an important inequality on the distance between any pair of mutually exclusive sets:
Proof of Lemma 3: For any pair of mutually exclusive sets , 
Proof of Lemma 4:

V. OPTIMAL DETECTOR FOR
In this section, we construct the optimal detector for the case where . From Corollary 1, we know that the optimal detector can be constructed by choosing an "appropriate" family of sets . It turns out that when this family of sets has a particularly simple structure.
Theorem 4: If , the family of sets that gives the optimal detector in (10) is of the form (12) where , and is the log-likelihood ratio of the distribution of the th measurement . By convention, and . 3 Before proving Theorem 4, we note that one can implement the optimal detector in (10) without actually computing and . When either or is empty, then one of the distances in (10) is and is simply a constant. When none of these sets is empty, it is straightforward to show that where is the number of elements in a set. The detection algorithm can be implemented as the following voting process:
• The detector computes individual estimates by a Neymann-Pearson detector based on individual (possibly manipulated) measurements :
.
• The optimal estimate is obtained by voting:
at least sensors estimate less than sensors estimate
A. Proof of Theorem 4
We start by noting that when the sets and are especially simple to compute: where is the Cartesian product. The following result is a straightforward consequence of the fact that and can be written as Cartesian products:
Lemma 6: If and , then and . The following result essentially states that the inner measure of Cartesian products is the product of inner measures of each set, which is trivial for measurable sets. The detail of the proof is reported in the Appendix for the sake of legibility. , without increasing the probability of error. Similarly, we can sequentially change to the form (12) without increasing the probability of error, which concludes the proof.
Remark 3: It is clear that and are functions of , when is of the form (12) . Due to Corollary 1, we know that (13) which can be solved numerically. Therefore, we effectively reduce the search space from all pairs of mutually exclusive sets in to a -dimensional vector of thresholds.
VI. A HEURISTIC DETECTOR FOR GENERAL
For general , it is difficult to find the optimal pair of sets and . As a result, in this section we propose a heuristic detector, where we design the set as where . It is easy to see that in that case, and are given by: (14) and (15) The corresponding heuristic detector is defined as .
A. Asymptotic Optimality
We first prove that is asymptotically optimal. To this end, we assume that the measurements are identically distributed. Let us define and as the probabilities of false alarm and detection of detector respectively, defined in (16) , then the probability of error for the heuristic detector converges to 0 as "fast" as that of the optimal detector.
It is well known that exists, which is formalized by the following lemma [17] :
Lemma 9 (Chernoff Lemma): The optimal decay rate for is given by
The following theorem proves that the heuristic detector decays as "fast" as the optimal detector: Theorem 5: and exist. Moreover, the following equality holds: (17) Proof: Due to Lemma 8, we know that . As a result, we only need to prove that . From the definition of and the fact that 4 , 4 We use the fact that and defined in (14), (15) As a result, . Remark 5: Theorem 5 claims that the heuristic detector achieves the same convergence rate as the optimal detector . As a result, if , which means a small percentage of the measurements are corrupted, then the heuristic detector is a good approximation of the optimal detector and should be used due to its low computational complexity.
B. Computation of the Heuristic Detector
Computation of is challenging even if the sets and are given by (14) and (15) . This is due to the fact that computing the Hamming distance between a point and set is a difficult task.
In this subsection, we show that for a special, yet sizeable, class of distributions the corresponding has a simple structure, if the following assumption is satisfied:
(H1) The result presented in this subsection does not require that s are identically distributed. Remark 6: This assumption is satisfied by several important distributions. Among them an important one occurs when the s are Gaussian random variables with different means under each hypothesis but with the same variance.
Let us first arrange s as , such that Also define the index set
It is easy to check that . Now let us define function as . The following theorem claims that the heuristic detector has the following form:
Theorem 6: Consider the heuristic detector defined in (16) with and If assumption (H1) is satisfied, then the heuristic detector can be computed as
The proof of Theorem 6 is quite technical and hence is reported in the Appendix for the sake of legibility. We would like to remark that the function is the truncated sum of log-likelihood ratio since it is the sum of log-likelihood ratios whose values are in the middle. As a result, can be computed very efficiently by the following procedures:
• The detector sorts all the log-likelihood ratio of individual measurements in descending order.
• The detector throws away measurements with the largest s and measurements with the smallest s.
• The detector sums the remaining s and compares it to . The detector chooses if the truncated sum is less than , otherwise the detector chooses . The complexity of such detector is , which is the complexity for sorting the likelihood ratio. 
A. Optimal Detector for
We first consider the case where . It is easy to prove that s in Theorem 4 are of the form (19) with . Moreover, the following results use symmetry to provide an even tighter characterization of the sets corresponding to the optimal detector.
Theorem 7: In the case of i.i.d. Gaussian measurements and , the optimal worst-case probability of error is given by (20) where Moreover, the s of the optimal detector in (10) are symmetric and of the form (21) for any that achieves the supremum in (20).
Remark 7:
The main difference between Theorem 7 and 4 is that all the individual thresholds in Theorem 7 are essentially the same, which reduces the search space further from to . Before proving Theorem 7, we need the following lemma, which characterizes one important property of :
Lemma 10: satisfies the following inequality:
Moreover, the equality holds only when . Proof: It is easy to see that (22) holds if is strictly concave. Consider the second derivative of , we have Therefore, we only need to prove that It is easy to derive that Thus, As a result, is strictly concave, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 7:
From the definition of function, it is trivial to see that Therefore,
Let us denote by the constant in (19) that corresponds to the optimal detector .
If either or is empty, then or and the proof is trivial. As a result, we assume that and are non-empty. By contradiction assume that . By Lemma 10, we know that Therefore, the following thresholds are strictly better than , which contradicts the optimality of . We thus conclude that all the must be equal since the same argument could have been made for any pair of 's, which proves (21). The result then follows from this and (23). In Fig. 1 we plot the probability of error versus the threshold for different pairs of . The parameters are chosen as follows:
The optimum for is the pair , . The optimum for , is , . For the case , , the optimal is actually . Therefore, the optimal detector is simply .
B. Heuristic Detector for
In the case when we can resort to the heuristic detector proposed in Section VI, as Gaussian i.i.d. variables satisfy assumption (H1). Here we wish to present some simulation results that clearly show the asymptotic optimality of such detector. We assume that and . Fig. 2 shows the probability of error versus for the heuristic detector proposed in Section VI and a constant detector . The is computed as the empirical probability by averaging random experiments. It can be seen when is close to , the heuristic detector is even worse than the constant detector, which shows that the heuristic detector is not necessarily optimal. However, as goes to infinity. decays as "fast" as , which illustrates that the heuristic detector is asymptotically optimal, as is proved in Theorem 5.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we consider the problem of designing detectors able to minimize the probability of error with corrupted measurements due to integrity attacks on a subset of the sensor pool. The problem is posed as a minimax optimization where the goal is to design the optimal detector against all possible attacker's strategies. We show that if the attacker can manipulate at least half of the measurements then the optimal worst-case detector should ignore all measurements and be based solely on the a-priori information. When the attacker can manipulate less than of half of the measurements , we show that the optimal detector is a threshold rule based on a Hamming-like distance between the manipulated measurement vector and two appropriately defined sets. For a particular case we are able to compute the optimal detector, showing that it consists of a simple voting scheme. A heuristic detector, which is asymptotically optimal when , is proposed for general . We further apply the results to i.i.d. Gaussian case because of its importance in practical applications. For this class of systems we derive the explicit optimal detector for the case where . For general , we corroborate, via simulation, the asymptotic optimally of the heuristic detector shown previously in the paper.
APPENDIX
1) Proof of Lemma 7:
Before proving Lemma 7, we first prove a preliminary lemma on the relationship between and the corresponding : Lemma 11: Let be mutually exclusive sets generated as follows 
